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Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 Patiently, passionately, Lucien Bianco has successfully concluded a mission that looked
impossible :  to explore the immensity of  the Chinese peasantry and to describe the
behaviour,  over  the  half-century  preceding  the  conquest  of  power  by  the  Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), of those 400 million people who cultivated in the traditional
way 100 million hectares and eked out a miserable existence from it. From his very first
article (“Les paysans et  la révolution :  Chine 1919-1969”
1
,  followed by “Sociétés secrètes et
autodéfense paysanne (1921-1933)”
2
, and by “Peasant movements”
3
), Bianco threw doubt on a
number  of  certainties  relating  to  what  was  then  considered  the  greatest  peasant
revolution in world history.  His provocative hypotheses served to inspire dozens of
innovative monographs, particularly in the United States. He succeeded eventually in
winning  access  in  the  People’s  Republic  to  a  wealth  of  local  archive  material  and
monographs (xianzhi and wenshi ziliao) made available only in the 1980s and 1990s. This
was the basis for a book, published in 2001, the title of which reflected its originality :
Peasant Without the Party : Grass-Roots Movements in Twentieth-Century China
4
. Its original
analyses are partly taken up again in Bianco’s new book. And he goes on to offer a
much more orderly and systematic presentation of the results of his enquiries, thus
crowning  nearly  four  decades  of  research.  This  work  of  maturity  is  an  overview,
recalling in some respects the ambitions of former doctoral theses―but free of the
stylistic ponderousness one associates with this kind of production.
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2 On the contrary, the writer chats informally (“me too”) with his readers, replying here
and there to objections that resurface elsewhere, as in a conversation, with no hint of
that  lofty  tone  that  academics  are  expected  to  adopt.  Thus,  addressing  anyone
protesting against his decision to restrict his study to spontaneous peasant movements
while excluding those whipped up from outside, principally by the communists, and
further addressing anyone who might feel he was thus in danger of underestimating
the  peasants’  fighting  spirit,  Bianco  replies  on  page  221  that  the  communist
interventions, by systematically politicising the peasant movements, exposed them to
repression  and  drove  as  many  peasants  away  from  the  struggle  as  it  brought  in.
Similarly, Chapter 3 (“Numbers”, pp. 104 to 129) is a model of intelligent evaluation of
the  statistical  data  he  employs.  Bianco’s  conclusions  are  half-way  between  some
writers’  excessive  confidence  in  statistics  and  the  systematic  mistrust  adopted  by
others. A “materialist” himself (page 17), Bianco is not one of those inverted dogmatists
asserting culture before economics ; to him the economy is the basic motor of historical
change. Nor, however, is he a positivist, paralysed by fear of advancing any conclusion
not backed up by innumerable documents. This attitude saves him from adopting a
moralist position or from being contemptuous of the peasants in the third part of the
book  (pp.  353-426),  which  deals  with  “peasant  revolts  and  modernisation”.  It  was
tempting and partly justified to give the title “Peasants against Progress” to these three
chapters. They describe the opposition to the banning of opium and to the authorities’
legal measures to force Zhejiang peasants to purchase only the silkworm cocoons sold
by official  agencies,  and not to use the often unhealthy eggs obtained on the farm.
However, Bianco analyses the real motives behind this often violent unrest (pp. 366-369
and pp.  389-391).  He does  this,  not  by posing as  an intellectual  with an answer to
everything from the comfort of his armchair, but by placing himself on a level with
these poverty-stricken workers on the edge of starvation who find themselves deprived
of a living wage or driven into new expenditure. One is reminded of the recent Bolivian
election that brought Evo Morales, the Aymara Indian candidate of the “cocaleros”, to
the  Bolivian  presidency !  Unceasingly,  Bianco  shares  with  us  his  scruples  and  the
fragility of some of his hypotheses. He is ever-present, in the first person, in a book that
often reads like an intellectual adventure.  Despite the mass of facts,  figures,  tables,
charts and graphs, despite the avalanche of notes, one can never tire of following him
in his explorations. The insertion of translated or summarised texts in the course of the
narrative,  the richness  of  detail,  the constant  care to  provide comparisons,  all  this
combines to transport the reader into a world teeming with millions of obscure lives.
One can breathe the acrid smells of the Chinese soil ; one is sucked into the mud of the
paddy-fields ; one sees the lined faces of these wretched people living from day to day,
resigned for the most part, but occasionally rebellious. Moreover, the book’s title might
have been borrowed from another excellent recent work on the world of the former
peasants, one often quoted by Bianco : La Rébellion française :  mouvements populaires et
conscience sociale (1661-1789), by Jean Nicolas
5
.
3 Indeed, Bianco presents to us the Chinese rebellion in a 90% rural China, taking as his
starting-point the record of 3,579 conflicts that took place between 1900 and 1949, 70
per year. The figure roughly corresponds to the 8,500 conflicts, as described by Jean
Nicolas, between 1661 and 1789, 65 per year, in a country twelve times less populated.
And indeed, this reference is explicit in the title Bianco gives to his own book, using the
Old French term “jacqueries”, or “peasant revolts” for events that took place several
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centuries  later  and thousands  of  miles  away,  but  in  which he  recognises  profound
similarities.
4 In fact, the attitude of the Chinese peasants at the end of the Qing Dynasty and during
the Republic often mirrors that of the French peasants of the Ancien Régime. When we
leave China’s coastal cities, travelling up the rivers and deep into the interior, are we
not—even today—travelling backwards in time ? Just like the rebels in the time of the
Sun King, the Chinese peasants showed astonishing tolerance of the exploitation they
were subjected to,  and very little  class  consciousness.  When they did  rise  up,  they
usually blamed the state and its agents. Thus, Bianco lists (in Table 5, p.  116) 1,140
uprisings against taxation and 800 against the administration, including 306 against
conscription. Admittedly, in contrast with these 1,940 occurrences of peasants clashing
with various forms of authority, he finds 1,395 conflicts within society itself ;  but of
these,  802  were  outbreaks  of  looting or  subsistence  riots  and  380  were  horizontal
conflicts  (xiedou,  vendettas)  leading  to  often  bloody  skirmishes  between villages  or
clans. Only 154 recorded conflicts, that is, 4.3% of the total, arose out of resistance to
farm tenancy (kangzu), whereas the tenant farmers (diannong) who made up the great
majority of the peasants (each cultivating on average half a hectare) had to hand over
nearly half (46%) of their crop, in money or in kind, to the landowner—and on top of
that deduction they had to pay taxes. 
5 Peasant revolt tends to be conservative. It defends the status quo under threat from
such-and-such an aggravation of  taxation,  surtaxes  or  some other  exaction.  And it
aspires to the dream of a golden age far in the past.  Furthermore, the catalogue of
peasant struggles (Chapter 4) is very traditional. In particular, there is the “great feast”
(chi dahu) in the invaded estates of such-and-such country squire, as described with
delight by Mao Zedong in his famous report on peasant uprisings in the province of
Hunan. Even when one seems to discern something resembling a strike, as with the
jiaonong (jiaona nongju, the handing over of farm implements), this type of uprising (the
peasants would abandon their tools in front of the administration offices to show that
they  were  refusing  to  work  in  such  conditions)  existed  well  before  the  incipient
workers’  movement  made  this  kind  of  resistance  popular—so  it  was  not  a  rural
duplication. Let us consider the classification of popular uprisings proposed by Charles
Tilly.  He  distinguishes  between  those  he  calls  “competitive”  where  rivals  dispute
possession of limited resources, those he calls “reactive” where collective rights are
defended against the state and its agents, and those he calls “proactive” where people
seek to acquire new advantages and put forward political demands where necessary.
This third category hardly existed. The conflicts before 1949 were mostly “reactive”
and  secondarily  “competitive”.  People  were  not  attacking  the  established  order ;
rather, they were taking action against the disorder caused by injustices on the part of
those in power. 
6 Having carefully examined this spontaneous peasant resistance,  the author looks in
Part Four at the relations between peasants and the Revolution (pp. 423-494). Chapter
17,  “Peasants and Communists  in the Conquest  of  Power”,  puts forward a different
interpretation of this event from that of Chalmers Johnson ; writing in 1962, with his
eyes fixed on the Vietnam War, Johnson saw in the victory of the communists in China
the  success  of  the  nationalists,  Tito-style,  facing  the  Japanese  aggressors.  It  is  also
different from that of all the historians who—taking their lead from Mark Selden (in
1971  and  again  in  1995)—have  been  insisting  on  social  factors  in  the  peasant
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mobilisation  behind  the  communists.  Bianco  borrows  for  his  own  use  (p.  439)  an
expression of Gregor Benton, for whom “it is weapons and not classes that made the
Chinese revolution”, while making it clear all the same that this victory would not have
been possible if the intellectuals and the other professional revolutionaries who were
leading the Communist Party had not been able to mobilise these victorious peasant
armies.  By  presenting  the  revolution  as  a  construction  and  not  as  a  spontaneous
uprising, Bianco supports Chen Yung-fa’s demonstration in his book Making Revolution :
the Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China 1937-1945
6
. 
7 In his approach, Bianco relies on the results of the examination of the peasant world
that  he  has  carried  out  over  the  earlier  chapters :  the  peasants’  behaviour  was
particularist and defensive ; their class consciousness was weak, but accompanied by
the desire to protect their local community. Indeed, Mao Zedong complained in 1928
that “the masses are cold and reserved” towards the revolutionaries. Without having
succeeded in  completely  changing that  attitude,  the  communists  did  manage—with
unintended help from the Japanese—to push the peasants into a real turnabout : they
had to confront a political and social status quo that only recently they had been seeking
to preserve. We know the proverb “the poor don’t attack the rich ; the people don’t
attack the mandarins (pin mo doufu, min mo dou guan)”, to which one may add another
proverb—though it seems at first to be contradictory : “It is the mandarins who force
the people into rebellion (guan bi min fan).” The Communist Party had to act in such a
way,  despite  the  peasants’  mistrust,  that  an  occasional  rebellion,  due  to  the  bad
behaviour of  someone representing a  power otherwise accepted,  should become an
indestructible  submission  to  a  revolutionary  party.  This  difficult  alchemy,  “hewing
from the rough stone the foot soldiers of the revolution” was the work of a hard core of
communist activists recruited first of all from the rural elite who had been educated in
the cities and then rejected. Their youth was a more decisive factor in recruiting them
than  their  social  origin,  despite  assertions  to  the  contrary  from  communist
theoreticians.  Once  the  Communist  Party  had  succeeded  locally  in  building  up  an
effective administrative structure backed by credible armed forces, the peasants rallied
to it in order to survive, in the face of terrorist and predatory raids by the Japanese.
Without the latter, the CCP would probably never have succeeded. 
8 When necessary, as during the winter of 1941, in Licheng in Shanxi, the communists
used the peasant forces to maintain control over villages seeking freedom. During the
civil war, from 1946 onwards, the vengeful spirit of the Guomindang, who wanted to
punish all  those who had accepted communist power,  and the White Terror,  which
accompanied in the recaptured villages the victorious return of its armies until  the
summer of 1947, combined in restoring to the communists their protective role. They
strengthened it by redistributing to the poor peasants and the farm labourers the land
seized from the landowners. Furthermore, the violence of the actions undertaken by
peasants  against  the  wealthy (when the communists  gave them the opportunity  to
express  it),  which had appeared already during the  brief  Hailufeng Soviet  between
October 1927 and February 1928 (p. 453), reflects the sharpness of those social tensions
in  the  villages  concealed  behind  the  Confucian  parade  of  paternalist  consensus
(ganqing) : the communist mobilisation brought to light this latent dynamism. Thus, an
unequal exchange was effected between the Communist Party and the peasantry : the
peasants contributed money, work and young recruits in exchange for security and
land.  They  still  preserved  a  certain  distance,  as  William  Hinton  shows  in  Fanshen,
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published in 1966, which describes the hesitations of the peasants in a Shanxi village
that  had  fallen  into  communist  control  as  early  as  autumn  1947.  Without  the
communists,  the  peasants  would  have  remained at  the  stage  of  mere  revolt.  Their
revolutionary  consciousness  was  built  from  outside.  This  interaction  between  the
Communist Party and rural society changed both of them, but not completely : the CCP
remained Leninist and determined to impose socialism at the instigation of a Party-
state that seized for itself the monopoly of power, whereas the elements of continuity
observed  in  the  study  of  spontaneous  uprisings  among  the  peasantry  were  more
powerful than the disruption to which peasants were subjected between 1947 and 1951
in the context of the communist victory and the agrarian reforms.
9 The 36 pages, only 13% of the whole book, that Bianco devotes to presenting the overt
or  covert  resistance  of  the  peasants  to  the  communist  government  do  not  have,
obviously,  the  same  status  as  the  455  preceding  pages.  He  seeks  in  these  last  two
chapters to invite researchers to follow him in the approach he has taken so far, when
conditions become favourable. He identifies tendencies in the form of hypotheses based
on other people’s books, except for a few points where he has himself been able to build
up  a  dossier :  the  village  vendettas  (xiedou),  for  instance,  or  the  anti-tax  riots  in
Renshou (Sichuan) in 1993 (pp. 470-471). To others is left the task of studying on the
ground the changes that sociologists or ethnologists may already observe, as does the
collective work directed by Isabelle Thireau and Wang Hansheng, the results of which
are presented in Disputes au village chinois,  Formes du juste et  recompositions locales des
espaces  normatifs.
7
 We  may  compare  the  results  of  this  field  study,  focused  on  the
countryside during the years following Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, with those reached in
the same writer’s earlier work in collaboration with Hua Linshan, Enquête sociologique
sur  la  Chine  1911-1949
8
.  Bianco contributes  an article,  (Xiedou et  équité)  to  Disputes  au
village. Rather surprisingly missing from these two books (and consequently from the
article) is the excellent bibliography supplied in Bianco’s book.
10 Concluding his preceding survey, in these few pages Bianco puts his hypotheses to the
test of practical experience by examining the peasants’ subsequent behaviour during
the second half of the last century. He adds a reflection on the “weapons of the weak”
(an expression borrowed from James Scott),  ranging from slow or botched work to
sabotage, which he sees rather as weak weapons, unlike Daniel Kelliher who in 1992
described them as  the  bases  of  “peasant  power”.  Elizabeth Perry,  in  a  1985  article
(published in the China Quarterly) on rural violence in socialist China, believed she could
distinguish two types of behaviour among the peasants, one essentially “reactive” up to
1980, and the other essentially “competitive” since the reforms. But Bianco favours the
continuity of an essentially “reactive” resistance, and still not very “proactive”, bearing
in mind that the spectacular increase in this resistance, which has risen from a few
thousand conflicts in the 1990s to 74,000 this year, is largely explained by the drop in
the efficiency of social control, compared with what it was in Mao’s time, and by less
severe repression, and does not in any way reflect greater impoverishment among the
peasants.
11 Lastly,  Bianco reflects on present-day changes and on early indications,  perhaps,  of
politicisation. But he seems content to sum up with the judgement that closes his book
on page 493 :  “The peasants are still  not ready to take aim at  the government .  .  .
Neither will  they act  as a reserve force for the city dwellers,  whom they envy and
detest, and who despise them. City dwellers—and, in particular, intellectuals—are no
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more eager than the Party leadership for a democracy that would give majority rule to
the peasants. This would continue to be the case for several decades to come, until a
still  more massive rural  exodus may settle  once and for all  the migrants and their
descendants in the cities”.
12 In exact conformity with this pattern were the recent serious incidents in Guangdong
province when peasants were thrown off their land with derisory compensation (and
have still not been allowed back). Thus, what do we observe in the village of Dongzhou,
in the sub-prefecture of Shanwei, where the police killed between three and twelve
demonstrators and established something like a state of siege ? Essentially, a strong
continuity with the uprisings of the last century : the demonstrators progressed from
peaceful  behaviour,  burning  incense  and  kowtowing  to  the  representatives  of
authority,  to  extreme  violence  when  no  one  would  listen  to  them.  Moreover,  the
authorities sent to prison the local deputy police chief who apparently ordered his men
to  open  fire,  while  standing  firm  on  the  decisions  that  had  prompted  the
demonstrations.  We  should  remember  that  this  was  quite  close  to  Honghai  wan,
formerly know as Bias Bay, a favoured haunt over decades past, of fearsome pirates. We
hear  that  reinforcements  for  the  demonstration  came  hurrying  in  from  the
surrounding area and especially from Lufeng. It would be hard not to think of those
peasant unions of Haifeng and Lufeng organised by Peng Pai ; or of the terrible Soviet of
Hailufeng where, during the winter of 1927-28, the forces of repression and the rebel
peasants vied with each other in horrific acts of cruelty, to be duplicated during the
Cultural Revolution. In this way one can understand a little better the nervousness of
the forces of repression and the unwonted boldness of the 300 peasant activists who
were defying them. Alternatively, one might rather pick out the new aspects of this
conflict : the demonstrators sending digital photos to the Hong Kong newspapers, the
presence  of  journalists  assuming  greater  importance  because  the  World  Trade
Organisation was about to meet in Hong Kong, and the protest against the construction
of a coal-fired power station being accompanied by ecological considerations arising
from the pollution of a nearby fishing lake. Only the future can reveal whether these
peasant protests over the past year or two have ushered in a new era. And whether
Bianco will have to revise his conclusion. 
13 For the time being, Jacqueries et révolution helps us not only to understand the history of
the  Chinese  peasants  during  the  last  century,  but  also  to  evaluate  the  present-day
uprisings of the Chinese peasantry, confronted by globalisation and the contradictions
of the harsh yet spectacular industrial revolution now in progress.
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